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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Markus Rey Archuleta timely appeals from the district court's judgment of 
conviction. On appeal, Mr. Archuleta argues that the district court erred when it denied 
his motion for mistrial. Alternatively, Mr. Archuleta argues that the district court erred 
when it denied his motion to strike evidence, which the district court had previously 
ruled was inadmissible. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In January of 2014, a Rite-Aid loss prevention employee, David Duncan, called 
the police and reported a fraud in progress. (R, p.54; 05/08/14 Tr., p.76, Ls.11-16.) 
Mr. Duncan alleged that Mr. Archuleta was attempting to fraudulently return 
merchandise. (R., p.54.) The police responded and arrested Mr. Archuleta. (R., p.54.) 
In February of 2014, the same employee called the police and said that 
Mr. Archuleta had entered the Rite-Aid again and accused Mr. Duncan of calling the 
police during the January 2014 incident. (R., p.55.) Mr. Duncan told the police that 
Mr. Archuleta also threw a box of band-aids at him and knocked merchandise onto the 
floor. (R., p.55.) 
Police quickly arrived and began questioning Mr. Archuleta about his interaction 
with Mr. Duncan. (R., p.55.) After a brief conversation, the police arrested 
Mr. Archuleta for witness intimidation. (R., p.55.) The police searched Mr. Archuleta 
and discovered some pipes with white residue. (R., p.55.) 
Mr. Archuleta was charged, by information, with disturbing the peace, possession 
of drug paraphernalia, possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and a 
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.42-43, 67-68, 75-77.) Prior to trial, the State 
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filed two motions requesting the district court admit evidence under I.R.E. 609 and 
I.R.E. 404(b), both of which the district court denied. (R., pp.70-74, 78.) Some of the 
evidence which was excluded by the district court under I.R.E. 404(b) included any 
reference to Mr. Archuleta's interaction with Mr. Duncan in January of 2014. (R., pp.72-
74, 78.) 
The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the State's first witness testified as to the 
evidence which the district court previously excluded. When asked why he called the 
police in February 2014, Mr. Duncan testified that, "I had someone enter the store, 
approach me in an aisle, called out to me saying, 'Are you the mother F'er that called 
the cops on me."' (05/08/14 Tr., p.77, Ls.5-13.) Mr. Archuleta's defense counsel 
immediately objected. (05/08/14 Tr., p. 77, Ls.14-16.) Outside the presence of the jury, 
defense counsel noted that the district court previously excluded any reference to the 
January 2014 events, and he moved for a mistrial. (05/08/14 Tr., p.77, L.17 - p.78, L.4.) 
The State recognized the error and asserted that this was an accident. (05/08/14 
Tr., p.78, Ls.5-9.) The district court ruled that Mr. Duncan's intent was irrelevant and 
the prior events were not supposed to be referenced. (05/08/14 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-12.) 
The State requested a limiting instruction instead of a new trial. (05/08/14 Tr., p.78, 
Ls.13-15.) Defense counsel responded by saying, "If the Court is not inclined to grant 
mistrial, we ask at least that [the court] order [the] statement [be] struck from the record 
and the jury not to consider it." (05/08/14 Tr., p.78, Ls.16-19.) 
After expressly finding that there should have been no testimony referencing the 
prior events, the district court implicitly denied the motion for mistrial. (05/08/14 
Tr., p.78, L.20 - p.80, L.1.) The district court also declined to strike the testimony, 
reasoning that it did not want to highlight Mr. Duncan's testimony. (05/08/14 Tr., p.78, 
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L.20 - p.80, L.1.) The jury trial proceeded, and there were no more references to the 
events which occurred in January of 2014. (See generally 05/08/14 Tr.) 
The jury ultimately acquitted Mr. Archuleta on the disturbing the peace charge 
and on the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, but rendered a guilty verdict on 
the possession of methamphetamine charge. (R., pp.106-108.) The jury also convicted 
Mr. Archuleta on the persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.111.) Thereafter, the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with one year fixed. 
(R., pp.113-114.) 
Mr. Archuleta timely appealed. (R., pp.120-122.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court commit reversible error when it denied Mr. Archuleta's 
motion for a mistrial? 
2. Did the district court commit reversible error when it failed to provide a limiting 
instruction after the State's witness testified to evidence which the district court 




The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Archuleta's Motion 
For A Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
Both parties and the district court agreed that the introduction of Mr. Duncan's 
testimony constituted a defect in the legal proceedings. As such, the limited question 
on appeal is whether the district court committed reversible error when it denied 
Mr. Archuleta's motion for a mistrial. Mr. Archuleta argues that the district court 
committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Archuleta's motion for mistrial because 
Mr. Duncan's testimony was not struck from the record. Since the jury had been 
previously instructed to consider all of the evidence unless the district court instructed 
otherwise, it must be presumed that the jury considered Mr. Duncan's testimony during 
its deliberations. Therefore, this evidence contributed to the jury's verdict. 
B. The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Denied Mr. Archuleta's 
Motion For Mistrial 
The following standards are utilized when the denial of a motion for mistrial is 
reviewed on appeal: 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial 
motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which 
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when 
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial 
has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a 
misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible 
error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident 
that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a 
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, 
constituted reversible error. 
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State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983). "Error is not reversible if this Court 
can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same if 
the error had not occurred." State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct App. 2010); see 
also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010) ("A defendant appealing from an 
objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish that such 
an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that 
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.") 
The following facts set forth the basis for Mr. Archuleta's motion for a mistrial. 
After Mr. Duncan was sworn, he was asked, "Do you remember an incident occurring 
that led you to call law enforcement?" (05/08/14 Tr., p.77, Ls.7-8.) Mr. Duncan said "I 
do" and the State asked "what was that?" (05/08/14 Tr., p.77, Ls.9-10.) Mr. Duncan 
replied, "I had someone enter the store, approach me in an aisle, called out to me 
saying, 'Are you the mother F'er that called the cops on me."' (05/08/14 Tr., p.77, 
Ls.11-13.) Mr. Archuleta's defense counsel immediately objected and, outside of the 
jury's presence, argued: 
[The] Court instructed the state's witness not [to) talk about the prior 
incident calling law enforcement. I know Mr. Ellsworth told the court he 
told Mr. Duncan not to say that. I have no reason to disbelieve that 
Mr. Ellsworth did not do that. Mr. Duncan did it anyway, and at this point I 
think I have no choice but to ask for mistrial for referencing calling the 
cops in the prior incident that the court instructed excluded. 
(05/08/14 Tr., p.77, L.21 - p.78, L.4.) The State asserted that this must have been 
unintentional as Mr. Duncan was not accustomed to testifying. (05/08/14 Tr., p.78, 
Ls.5-9.) The district court said, "Well, whether it was done intentionally or not, it wasn't 
supposed to be referenced .... " (05/08/14 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Archuleta's 
defense counsel then suggested, "If the Court is not inclined to grant mistrial, we ask at 
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least that [you] order that [the] statement [be] struck from the record and the jury not to 
consider it." (05i08/14 Tr., p.78, Ls.16-19.) 
The district court denied both the motion for mistrial and the motion to strike 
evidence, reasoning: 
I think it would be preferable not to call further attention to it. And so I'm 
going to allow it to continue. I'll consider how the Court can instruct in a 
way that doesn't end up underlining it I'm really concerned about there's 
not supposed to be any reference to prior stops, it's supposed to start with 
just yelling and swearing at this fellow, Mr. Duncan, and we are supposed 
to focus on what happened on February 15th, not some other day, not 
some other time. 
I'll consider how I will instruct on this without causing more problems. At 
this point I think it's been nipped in the bud. As long as it stays in the bud, 
we will keep going. 
(05/08/14 Tr., p.78, L20 - p.80, L 1.) Since the district court ruled, and the State 
conceded, that this evidence was improperly adduced at trial, the limited question on 
appeal is whether this error was reversible error. 
The introduction of Mr. Archuleta's prior interaction contributed to the jury's 
verdict because from the beginning of the trial the jurors were made aware of the fact 
Mr. Archuleta had done something which prompted Mr. Duncan to call the police. The 
jury would conclude that Mr. Archuleta is the kind of guy that regularly breaks the law. 
Additionally, the jury would also assume that Mr. Archuleta is a confrontational person 
who would be willing to provoke a person whom Mr. Archuleta determined had harmed 
him in the past. This negative character evidence was the first evidence the jury heard 
and it colored the jury's perception throughout the trial. Moreover, the jury might have 
thought that Mr. Archuleta did something malicious. It follows that the jury might have 
convicted him for one offense to ensure that he received some punishment. 
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Additionally, the introduction of Mr. Archuleta's prior interaction with Mr. Duncan 
contributed to his conviction in this matter as the State's evidence was very weak. 
Mr. Archuleta was acquitted for the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, which is 
an indicator that the jury did not find the evidence as to that charge compelling. 
(R., p.107.) Moreover, the State never presented any evidence that Mr. Archuleta knew 
the pipes contained methamphetamine residue. (05/08/14 Tr., p.175, Ls.6-10.) Based 
on this weak evidentiary showing, Mr. Archuleta's prior interaction with Mr. Duncan 
might have affected the guilty verdict. 
The district court's failure to strike the evidence only exacerbated the fact that the 
inadmissible character evidence influenced the jury's perception of the entirety of the 
evidence admitted at the trial. "Where improper testimony is inadvertently introduced 
into a trial and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is 
ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely." State v. 
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 193 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Since there was no limiting instruction, it 
should be presumed that the jury considered the erroneously adduced evidence 
throughout the rest of the trial. Support for this proposition can be found in the initial 
jury instructions provided by the district court. Prior to the trial, the district court told the 
jury that testimony from witnesses was considered evidence it must consider. (05/08/14 
Tr., p.62, Ls.6-7.) The district court then instructed the jury about the purpose of an 
objection and that it can consider evidence in the event the objection is overruled. 
(05/08/14 Tr., p.63, Ls.16 - p.64, L.21.) The district court instructed the jury: 
Once in a great while I'll order that something be stricken. It doesn't really 
come up much in real life, it comes up when there's not a problem with the 
question, the question was an okay question, but sometimes a witness will 
branch off into something else and they will not answer in a responsive 
way or there will be a problem with their response. If I order you to strike 
evidence, disregard it, don't make it a factor in your determination in this 
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case and don't base any decision in this case on evidence which has been 
stricken. It's just not good enough evidence for you to rely on. 
(05/08/14 Tr., p.64, L.22 - p. 65, L.9.) Since it is presumed that a jury will adhere to the 
district court instructions, Norton, 151 Idaho at 193, it follows that the jury adhered to 
the foregoing instructions and considered the erroneously adduced evidence 
throughout the trial. 
As a final note, the district court determined that it would not give the limiting 
instruction because it did not want to highlight the issue. However, defense counsel 
already objected and the jury left the room. (05/08/14 Tr., p.77, Ls.11-20.) This action 
had already brought significant attention to Mr. Duncan's testimony. Since the bell had 
already been rung, there was no way of de-emphasizing that evidence other than 
striking it. 
In sum, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Archuleta's motion for mistrial 
because the evidence pertaining Mr. Archuleta's prior interaction with Mr. Duncan 
indicated that Mr. Archuleta had done something which prompted Mr. Duncan to call the 
police. It also indicated that Mr. Archuleta is confrontational and returned to the store to 
provoke Mr. Duncan. Since the evidence was not struck form the record, it should be 
presumed that the jury adhered to the district court's instructions and considered this 
information during deliberations. When this is viewed in light of the fact the jury 
acquitted Mr. Archuleta on the possession of drug paraphernalia charge, the district 
court committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Archuleta's motion for mistrial. 
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11. 
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Failed To Provide A Limiting 
Instruction After The State's Witness Testified To Evidence Which The District Court 
Previously Ruled Was Inadmissible 
Mr. Archuleta argues that the district court committed a legal error when it failed 
to strike Mr. Duncan's testimony. See State v. Trowbridge, 97 Idaho 93, 98-99 (1975) 
(holding that a trial court must strike inadmissible evidence); see also State v. Hodges, 
105 Idaho 588, 592-593 (1983) (holding that it is error to introduce inadmissible 
evidence and the question on appeal is whether that error was harmless); State v. 
Gooclrich, 97 Idaho 472, 478-479 (1976) (Failure to provide a limiting instruction as to 
inadmissible evidence constitutes legal error). The district court's failure to strike the 
inadmissible evidence constituted legal error. Therefore, the only question on appeal is 
whether the district court's failure to strike the testimony was harmless. 
Mr. Archuleta argues that this error contributed to his conviction and, therefore, 
was not harmless error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010) ("A defendant 
appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to 
establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of 
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.") The specific 




Mr. Archuleta respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and remand this matter for a new trial. 
DATED this 4th day of February, 2015. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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